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Abstract
While specifications and verifications of concurrent systems employ Linear Temporal Logic (LT L), it is increasingly likely that
logical consequence in LT L will be used in the description of computations and parallel reasoning. Our paper considers logical
consequence in the standard LT L with temporal operations U (until) and N (next). The prime result is an algorithm recognizing
consecutions admissible in LT L, so we prove that LT L is decidable w.r.t. admissible inference rules. As a consequence we obtain
algorithms verifying the validity of consecutions in LT L and solving the satisfiability problem. We start by a simple reduction of
logical consecutions (inference rules) of LT L to equivalent ones in the reduced normal form (which have uniform structure and
consist of formulas of temporal degree 1). Then we apply a semantic technique based on LT L-Kripke structures with formula
definable subsets. This yields necessary and sufficient conditions for a consecution to be not admissible in LT L. These conditions
lead to an algorithm which recognizes consecutions (rules) admissible in LT L by verifying the validity of consecutions in special
finite Kripke structures of size square polynomial in reduced normal forms of the consecutions. As a consequence, this also solves
the satisfiability problem for LT L.
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1. Introduction
Temporal logics are currently the most widely used specification formalism for reactive systems. They were first
suggested to be used for specifying properties of programs in the late 1970s (cf. Pnueli [24]). The temporal framework
most used currently is linear-time propositional temporal logic (called LTL ), which has been studied from various
viewpoints of its application (cf. e.g. Manna and Pnueli [21,22], Clark E. et al., [4]). It is relevant to note that before
that mathematicians and philosophers had used similar logics to reason about knowledge and time (cf. e.g. Goldblatt
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[11], van Benthem [37,38]). In most applications LTL is based on infinite (potentially infinite) runs (which can be
viewed as states in linear discrete time). LTL has been quite successful in dealing with applications related to systems
specifications and verification, with model checking (cf. [2,4]). Temporal logic has numerous applications to safety,
liveness and fairness (cf. Emerson [6]), to various problems arising in computing (cf. Eds. Barringer, Fisher, Gabbay
and Gough, [1]).
The standard way of model checking an LTL-spec against a system is to translate the negation of the spec into a
non-deterministic Bu¨chi automaton (which incurs an exponential blowup), build the product of this system, and check
this product for emptiness (cf. Carsten [3]) or usage of a technique based on Rabin three theorem or other advanced
tools from automata theory (cf. Vardi [5,35]). In pure logical terms, it models the satisfiability problem: given a spec
(formula of LTL), to check whether there is a model for this spec (formula). A dual counterpart of this problem is the
decidability problem for LTL: does there exist an algorithm which by any given formula A verifies whether A is a
theorem of LTL (A ∈ LTL). Clearly, A is satisfiable iff ¬A is not a theorem of LTL.
A lot of research in LTL concerns constructions of most efficient algorithms for verifying satisfiability in LTL,
for model checking in LTL. For example, the decidability of LTL can be shown by bounded finite model property
(cf. Sistla, Clark [34]). In Kesten et al. [17] a tableau calculus for satisfiability in LTL+Past was found. A number
of distinct variations of LTL by extension of the set of logical operations were studied, e.g. Gabbay [8] proved that
the formulas of LTL with Past can be rewritten in future of only LTL with possible exponential blowup, and in [18]
it is shown that this exponential blowup is unavoidable. Vardi [36] developed two-way automata theory for a logic
containing LTL+Past . Lange [19] has given a decision procedure and a complete axiomatization for LTL+Past .
The property of satisfiability of formulas inLTL-Kripke structures is not expressible byLTL-formulas themselves,
it is a meta-property — it refers to the existence of particular LTL-Kripke structures but not to decidability of LTL
itself. Also description of specs – properties of models – may require establishing of logical dependencies between
specs. One of the possible ways to work out a common approach is to use logical consecutions (inference rules) which
can allow expressing subtler properties of models. A good example (which does not refer to LTL directly) is the
Gabbay’s irreflexivity rule for modal logic (cf. [9]) (gir) := ¬(p→♦p)→ϕ
ϕ
(where p does not occur in the formula ϕ).
This rule is actually saying that any element of a model, where ϕ is not valid, should be irreflexive; it was implemented
in [9] for the proof of the completeness theorem. Regarding LTL, logical consecutions can be applied as follows.
Given two LTL-specs (formulas) Sp1 and Sp2 and an LTL-Kripke modelM, the consecution Sp1/Sp2 is said to
be valid inM if Sp2 is valid inM when Sp1 does. The fact that a spec Sp is satisfiable inM is equivalent to the
validity of the consecution ¬Sp/⊥ inM. One more trivial fact, consider the specs p and q and the consecution (rule)
p/q (where p and q are merely labels). It actually says that in a given LTL-Kripke structure the spec q is valid if
the spec p is valid in all states. This cannot be easily described by an LTL-formula (say, the formula Gp → Gq can
be false in some LTL-Kripke structures where p/q is valid). So, consecutions (rules) may be useful for formalizing
dependencies between specs.
If researchers are interested in building effective axiomatic systems for LTL or in constructing fast provers, they
might be interested in the description of admissible rules. This leads to an issue of recognizing such rules, through,
e.g. computational procedures which could check admissibility. The question of admissibility belongs to the area
of meta-theory for propositional logic (it cannot be modeled inside of these logics). Propositional logics talk about
propositional letters and properties of models which can be represented by formulas composed of these letters. But
admissible rules talk about properties of formulas themselves, which may be expressed by terms constructed out of
these formulas.
The field of admissible rules is reasonably well developed for transitive modal and superintuitionistic logics (cf.
Ghilardi [10], Iemhoff [14], Jera´bek [15], Mints [23], Rybakov [25–29]). The origin of these problems can be traced
back to the Harvey Friedman problem [7] of whether there is an algorithm for verification of admissibility in the
intuitionistic propositional logic IPC. In the above-mentioned issues many approaches to check admissibility were
found, but they are applicable only to certain transitive modal and superintuitionistic logics. Up until now, for temporal
logics, not much was known. We would only refer to [30] and [31], where, in the latter, a temporal linear logic based
on finite intervals of numbers and with the language restricted to operations Next and Previous has been studied. An
algorithm deciding admissibility problem in this logic was found. However this logic has much less expressive power
and applications compared with LTL — it does not have Until operation (besides, the technique presented in [31]
does not allow us to immediately attack the analogue of Harvey Friedman problem for LTL).
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Therefore we aim our study of logical consecutions (inference rules) in LTL for the solution of an open problem:
whether LTL is decidable w.r.t. admissible consecutions (inference rules) (analogue of Harvey Friedman problem).
We study LTL in the standard temporal language with two temporal operations N (next) and U (until). The prime
problem we consider in general is the description of logical consequence in LTL by admissible inference rules. The
main result of the paper is an algorithm recognizing admissibility of logical consecutions (inference rules) in LTL.
A less general version of this algorithm gives an effective procedure to describe logical consecutions valid in LTL.
Also, as a simple consequence, we obtain an algorithm for solution satisfiability problem in LTL.
2. Definitions, notation
Temporal logics are, in essence, modal logics geared towards the description of the temporal ordering of events.
Linear temporal logics differ from typical modal logics by the presence of specific temporal operations which cannot
be expressed in standard modal language. The language of Linear Temporal Logic (LTL, for short, in the following)
extends the language of Boolean logic by operations N (next) and U (until). The formulas of LTL are built up from a
set Prop of atomic propositions (synonymously, propositional letters) and are closed under applications of Boolean
operations, the unary operation N (next) and the binary operation U (until). The formula Nϕ has meaning: ϕ holds in
the next time point (state); ϕUψ can be read: ϕ holds until ψ is true. In our paper we consider standard semantics for
LTL based on infinite transition systems (runs, computations), which we describe in terms of linear Kripke structures
based on natural numbers.
Infinite linear Kripke structures that we use to model LTL can be represented as quadruples M := 〈N ,≤,
Next, V 〉, where N is the set of all natural numbers, ≤ is the standard order on N , Next is the binary relation,
where a Next b means b is the number next to a, and V is a valuation of a subset S of Prop, which assigns truth
values to elements of S. So, for any p ∈ S, V (p) ⊆ N , V (p) is the set of all n fromN where p is true (w.r.t. V ). The
elements of N are states (worlds), ≤ is the transition relation (which is linear in our case), and V can be interpreted
as labeling of the states with atomic propositions. The triple 〈N ,≤,Next〉 is a Kripke frame which we will denote for
short by N . We will use the convenient notation Next(n) = m to represent n Next m, and write Nextt (n) for t ∈ N
to abbreviate Next(. . . (Next(n)) . . .) where Next is used t times. For any Kripke structureM, the truth values can be
extended from propositions of S to arbitrary formulas constructed from these propositions as follows:
∀p ∈ Prop (M, a) p ⇔a ∈ N ∧ a ∈ V (p);
(M, a) ϕ ∧ ψ ⇔(M, a) ϕ ∧ (M, a) ψ;
(M, a) ¬ϕ⇔not[(M, a) ϕ];
(M, a) Nϕ⇔∀b[(a Next b)⇒(M, b) ϕ];
(M, a) ϕUψ ⇔∃b[(a ≤ b) ∧ ((M, b) ψ) ∧
∀c[(a ≤ c < b)⇒(M, c) ϕ]].
To recall some necessary notation concerning Kripke structures, for any given Kripke structure M := 〈N ,≤,
Next, V 〉, |M| := N . We will mean (for short of notations), a ∈ M as a ∈ |M|. Dom(V ) is the set of all
propositional letters (labels) which are valuated by V inM, i.e. which belong to the domain of V . For any formula ϕ
constructed out of some propositional letters from Dom(V ), V (ϕ) := {a | a ∈ N , (M, a) Vϕ}. For any a ∈M,
ValV (a) := {p | p ∈ Dom(V ), (M, a) V p}. In the following we will also use such notation for Kripke structures
which are not necessarily based on N . For a formula ϕ and t ∈ N , Ntϕ is to abbreviate t-times application of the
operation N to the formula ϕ.
Using operations U and N we can define all standard temporal and modal operations. For instance, Fϕ (ϕ holds
eventually, which, in terms of modal logic, means ϕ is possible (denotation ♦ϕ)), can be described as true Uϕ.
Therefore, we can also define the modal operation  (as ϕ := ¬♦¬ϕ) in this language. The temporal operation
G, where Gϕ means ϕ holds henceforth, can be defined as ¬F¬ϕ. We can describe within this language various
properties of transition systems and Kripke structures. For instance, the formula G(¬request ∨ (request U grant))
says that whenever a request is made it holds continuously until it is eventually granted.
Definition 1. For a Kripke structureM := 〈N ,≤,Next, V 〉 and a formula ϕ in the language of LTL, we say that
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(i) ϕ is satisfiable inM (denotation —M Satϕ) if there is a state b ofM
(b ∈ N ) where ϕ is true: (M, b) Vϕ.
(ii) ϕ is valid inM (denotation —M ϕ) if, for any b ofM (b ∈ N ),
the formula ϕ is true at b (denotation: (M, b) Vϕ).
Definition 2. For a Kripke frame F := 〈N ,≤,Next〉 and a formula ϕ in the language of LTL, we say that
(i) ϕ is satisfiable in F (denotation F Satϕ) if there is a valuation V in the
frame F such that 〈F, V 〉 Satϕ.
(ii) ϕ is valid in F (denotation F ϕ) if not (〈N ,≤,Next〉 Sat¬ϕ).
Definition 3. The linear temporal logic LTL is the set of all formulas which are valid in all infinite temporal linear
Kripke structuresM based on N with standard ≤ and Next.
A formula ϕ in the language of LTL is satisfiable iff there is a valuation V in the Kripke frame N which makes
ϕ satisfiable: 〈N , V 〉 Satϕ. The satisfiability problem for LTL may be not too hard mathematically, but it is
not immediately obvious either, though computationally (well known) the problem is hard indeed. This is because
satisfiability in LTL refers to infinite frames of special structure. The algorithms for checking satisfiability in LTL
are profoundly studied (cf., for instance, Vardi [5,35], or the decidability of LTL by bounded finite model property in
Sistla, Clark [34]).
3. Logical consecutions, preliminary discussion
The basic problem we are dealing here is how to characterize that a formula (a statement) is a logical consequence
of a given collection of formulas (statements). We will consider logical consequence in terms of arbitrary logical
consecutions (synonymously, inference rules) the definition of which is recalled below. We have a potentially infinite
set of letters x1, . . . , xn, . . . which are called variables, or variable letters. They represent all possible formulas in
the language of LTL (that is why they are called variables). For any formula ϕ(p1, . . . , pn) in the language of
LTL constructed from propositional letters p1, . . . pn , the formula ϕ(x1, . . . , xn) is the result of replacement in
ϕ(p1, . . . , pn) of all pi by xi .
A consecution, (or synonymously — a rule, inference rule) c is an expression
c := ϕ1(x1, . . . , xn), . . . , ϕm(x1, . . . , xn)
ψ(x1, . . . , xn)
,
where ϕ1(x1, . . . , , xn), . . . , ϕm(x1, . . . , xn) and ψ(x1, . . . , xn) are arbitrary formulas constructed from variable
letters, as explained above. The formula ψ(x1, . . . , xn) is the conclusion of c, formulas ϕ j (x1, . . . , xn) are the
premises of c, letters xi are variables of c. Consecutions are supposed to describe the logical consequences, an
informal meaning of a consecution is that the conclusion logically follows from the premises. The questions what
logically follows means is crucial and has no evident and unique answer. We consider and compare below some
approaches.
First, we define valid consecutions. Let F be a frame, e.g. our linear temporal frame N , with a valuation V of
all variables from a consecution c := ϕ1, . . . ϕn/ψ . The consecution c is said to be valid in the Kripke structure
〈F, V 〉 (notation 〈F, V 〉 c, or F V c) if (〈F, V 〉 ∧1≤i≤m ϕi ) ⇒ (〈F, V 〉 ψ). That is, c is valid in 〈F, V 〉
if the following holds. If all premises of c are valid in F w.r.t. V (which means they are true in all worlds from F),
then the conclusion is valid in F w.r.t V (again in all worlds from F) as well. Note that, if c := ϕ1, . . . ϕn/ψ is
valid in 〈F, V 〉, then it does not imply, in general, that the formula ϕ1 ∧ · · · ∧ ϕn → ψ is valid in 〈F, V 〉. Indeed,
consider as an example the frame N with the valuation V (x1) := {m | m > 1}, V (x2) := {m | m > 2}, and the
consecution c := x1/x2. Then evidently c is valid inN w.r.t. V , but (N , 2)  V x1 → x2. So, the notions of validity for
consecutions cannot be expressed by merely the validity of implications, it is weaker, because it describes properties
which hold in frames globally. In particular, this is why we should use variable letters but not merely propositional
letters in consecutions (inference rules).
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A consecution c is valid in a frame F (notation F c) if, for any valuation V , F V c. If a consecution c is not
valid in F w.r.t. some valuation V , then we say c is refuted in F , or refuted in F by V , and write F  V c. Note that
this definition of valid consecutions is equivalent to the notion of valid modal sequents from [16], where a theory of
sequent-axiomatic classes is developed. Also the notion of valid consecutions can be reduced to validity of formulas
in the extension of the language with universal modality (cf. Goranko and Passy, [12]). Based on these results, some
relevant approach to validity of consecutions can be derived.
Some examples of consecutions valid in LTL, i.e. valid in the frame N defining the logic LTL, are given below:
Gx1/x1, x1/Nx1, GFx1 ∧ GF¬x1/GF(x1 ∧ N¬x1).
First two consecutions are trivially valid, validity of the third one can be seen by simple computation. Notice that,
x1 → Nx1 /∈ LTL, so, x1 → Nx1 is invalid in the LTL-formula. It is easy to accept that valid consecutions
correctly describe logical consequence. But a reasonable question is whether we could restrict ourselves by only such
consecutions studying a given logic L .
Other correct consecutions are the so-called derivable consecutions. For a logic L with a fixed-axiomatic system
AxL, a consecution cs := ϕ1, . . . , ϕn/ψ , is said to be derivable if ϕ1, . . . , ϕn `AxL ψ (i.e. if we can derive ψ from
ϕ1, . . . , ϕn in the given axiomatic system AxL). The derivable consecutions are certainly correct. Besides, derivable
consecutions must be valid (it is well known and can easily be shown by induction on length of the derivations).
Because we do not refer in this paper to axiomatic systems of LTL, we cannot provide particular examples of
derivable in LTL consecutions. But, in general, valid but not derivable consecutions exist. As a trivial example,
take the axiomatic system for LTL consisting of all formulas of LTL as axioms and having no inference rules at all.
Then x1/Nx1 is valid in LTL but not derivable in this axiomatic system. So, the class of all valid consecutions is
bigger than the class of all derivable ones.
Now we introduce the strongest class of possible structural logical consecutions correct for a given logic L which
is the main objective of our paper — admissible consecutions. Such consecutions were proposed by Lorenzen (1955)
[20], the definition is as follows. Given an arbitrary propositional logic L, FormL is the set of all formulas in the
language of L. Let c := ϕ(x1, . . . , xn), . . . , ϕm(x1, . . . , xn) /ψ(x1, . . . , xn) be a consecution in the language of L.
Definition 4. Consecution c is said to be admissible in L if, ∀α1 ∈ FormL, . . . , ∀αn ∈ FormL,∧
1≤i≤m[ϕi (α1, . . . , αn) ∈ L] H⇒ [ψ(α1, . . . , αn) ∈ L].
Thus, for any admissible consecution, any instance into the premises making all of them theorems of L makes also
the conclusion to be a theorem. Any postulated rule of any logic L (being admissible in L by definition), e.g. modus
ponens rule: x1, x1 → x2/x2 for the classical propositional logic PC , works for proofs in L as is commented above.
As long as for some formulas ϕ1 and ϕ2, ϕ1 ∈ PC and ϕ1 → ϕ2 ∈ PC , we conclude ϕ2 ∈ PC . Like, for any formulas
ϕ1, ϕ2 and ϕ3 in the language of PC , we have ϕ1 → ϕ1 ∈ PC , (ϕ1 → ϕ1) → (ϕ3 → (ϕ1 → ϕ1)) ∈ PC and,
using modus ponens, we conclude ϕ3 → (ϕ1 → ϕ1) ∈ PC . This, in particular, why variable letters but not merely
propositional letters are used in the definition of rules and consecutions. Say, none of the formulas p1, p1 → p2,
where p1 and p2 are propositional letters, belong to PC , so modus ponens in the form p1, p1 → p2/p2 would be
trivial and would not work at all — no conclusions by this rule.
For any logic L, any consecution valid in all L-frames or derivable in an axiomatic system for L must be
admissible for L (very well known fact), the converse is not always true. Examples of invalid and non-derivable rules,
which are anyway admissible (for the intuitionistic logic and some modal logics) can be found in e.g. Harrop [13],
Mints [23], Rybakov [27].
Here we provide some simple examples of consecutions which are admissible but not valid in the frame N
generating the logicLTL (consequently, these rules are not derivable in any axiomatic system for LTL). The rules
Nx1/x1, Nx1 → Nx2/x1 → x2, Nx1 U Nx2/x1Ux2
are admissible but invalid in N . To show that, say, the third rule is invalid in N take the valuation V (x1) := {1},
V (x2) := {n | n ∈ N , n ≥ 2}. Then
(N , 0)  V x1Ux2 and N VNx1 U Nx2.
Invalidity of first two rules in N is trivially the same.
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To show that the consecution Nx1 U Nx2/x1Ux2 is admissible in LTL, assume that for some formulas ϕ1 and ϕ2
in the language of LTL, ϕ1Uϕ2 /∈ LTL. Then there is a valuation V in N , where (N , n)  Vϕ1Uϕ2 for some
n. Evidently we may admit (by shifting up) that (N , 0) V¬ϕ1 ∧ ¬ϕ2. Consider the new valuation V1 for all
propositional letters of ϕ1Uϕ2 in N , where, for any propositional letter pi , V1(pi ) := {n + 1 | n ∈ V (pi )}. Then, for
any formula ψ in letters from Dom(V ), for any n ∈ N , (N , n) Vψ iff (N , n + 1) V1ψ . Thus,
(N , 1) V1¬ϕ1 ∧ ¬ϕ2 and consequently (N , 0)  V1Nϕ1U Nϕ2,
which implies Nϕ1U Nϕ2 /∈ LTL. So, the consecution Nx1 U Nx2/x1Ux2 is admissible in LTL. The observations
above concerning admissibility of displayed consecutions are the consequence of the following general:
Proposition 5. If ϕ(p1, . . . , pn, q1, . . . , qm) is an arbitrary boolean formula constructed from propositional letters
p1, . . . , pn, q1, . . . , qm , then the consecution
ϕ(Nx1, . . . ,Nxn,Ny1UNz1 . . . ,NymUNzm)
ϕ(x1, . . . , xn, y1Uz1 . . . , ymUzm))
is admissible in LTL.
This can be showed by a simple argument similar to the above one for the consecution Nx1 U Nx2/x1Ux2. So, this
proposition gives an infinite set of admissible in LTL consecutions, where some infinite part of this set consists of
consecutions invalid in N . Actually these rules allow us to withdraw operation N from formulas of the premises. A
more curious example of admissible and invalid in LTL consecution is
c1 := GFx1 ∧ GF¬x1x2 .
Actually this is because this rule is passive: the premise of the rule never could be unified inLTL, i.e. GFϕ∧GF¬ϕ /∈
LTL for any formula ϕ. To see this, it suffices to use N with the valuation V , where all propositional letters of ϕ are
false w.r.t. V in all worlds.
The admissible consecutions, in general, are the most strong type of correct structural logical consecutions: a
consecution c is admissible in a logic L iff L, as the set of its own theorems (valid formulas), is closed with respect
to c. As we noticed above, all valid or derivable consecutions are admissible, but not always vice versa. Also, there
is an evident connection of admissibility with satisfiability: a formula ϕ is satisfiable in a logic L iff x1 → x1/¬ϕ
is not admissible in L. An early interest in admissibility problem was initiated by the Harvey Friedman problem [7]:
whether there exists an algorithm recognizing rules admissible in the intuitionistic propositional logic IPC. As we
mentioned in the introduction, this problem (and its analogues for other logics) and connected questions for various
non-standard logics were actively studied in the literature. Here we address the Friedman problem for the logic LTL.
4. Recognizing consecutions admissible in LTL
This section prepares a technique for the construction of an algorithm which distinguishes consecutions admissible
in LTL. Firstly we recall necessary definitions and known results which we will use in the following.
Definition 6. AKripke structureM is said to be definable if any state a ∈M is definable inM, i.e. there is a formula
φa which is true inM only at the element a.
Definition 7. Suppose we have a Kripke structureM := 〈F, V 〉 based upon a Kripke frame F and a new valuation
V1 in F of a set of propositional letters qi . The valuation V1 is definable inM if, for any qi , V1(qi ) = V (φi ) for some
formula φi .
Definition 8. Let a logic L and a Kripke structureM with a valuation defined for a set of letters p1, . . . , pk be given.
The structure M is said to be k-characterizing for L if the following holds. For any formula ϕ(p1, . . . , pk) built
using letters p1, . . . , pk , ϕ(p1, . . . , pk) ∈ L iffM ϕ(p1, . . . , pk).
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Lemma 9 (cf., for Instance, [27]). A consecution cs is not admissible in a logic L iff, for any sequence of k-
characterizing structures ChL(k), k ∈ N, there are a number k and the k-characterizing structure ChL(k) from
this sequence such that the frame of ChL(k) refutes cs by a certain definable in ChL(k) valuation.
Based on this lemma, in order to describe consecutions admissible in the logic LTL we need a sequence of k-
characterizing for LTL structures with appropriate properties. We propose a bit imperfect (because of the existence
of some infinite amount of excessive elements inside these structures, which are non-definable within these models)
k-characterizing structures for LTL constructed as follows. Take all the Kripke structures Ni , i ∈ I , all of which are
based on the frame N (described in the section with notations), with all possible valuations V of letters p1, . . . , pk .
Clearly, the family of all such structures is uncountable. Take the disjoint union
⊔
i∈I Ni of all such non-isomorphic
Kripke structures. It is an infinite, uncountable structure, which consists of components based on countable frames.
We denote this Kripke structure by Chk(LTL). The following lemma is evident.
Lemma 10. The structure Chk(LTL) is k-characterizing for LTL.
It is not difficult to show that any Kripke structure Chk(LTL) is not definable. Therefore we cannot directly
implement the technique from [31] to describe admissible in LTL consecutions. The starting point of our technique,
as in [31], is a reduction of consecutions to equivalent ones, but with temporal degree 1 (w.r.t. all occurring operations
U and N considered as temporal ones) and a simple homogeneous form. A consecution c is said to have the reduced
normal form if
c =
∨
1≤ j≤m(
∧
1≤i≤n[x t ( j,i,0)i ∧ (Nxi )t ( j,i,1) ∧
∧
1≤k≤n,k 6=i (xiUxk)t ( j,i,k,0)]),
x1
where xs are some variables (letters), where t ( j, i, z), t ( j, i, k, 0) ∈ {0, 1} and, for any formula α above, α0 :=
α, α1 := ¬α.
Definition 11. Let csnf be a consecution in the reduced normal form. csnf is said to be a normal reduced form for a
consecution cs iff, (i) cs is admissible in LTL iff csnf is so, and (ii) for the LTL-frame N , N cs⇔N csnf.
Using ideas of proofs for Lemma 3.1.3 and Theorem 3.1.11 from [27], following closely to the scheme of the
proofs there, we can (cf. for details, e.g., [31]) derive:
Theorem 12. There exists an algorithm which, for any given consecution cs, constructs its normal reduced form csnf
in single exponential time from the size of cs.
To describe further the construction of our algorithm we need the following notation and results.
Definition 13. Let two Kripke structures K1 := 〈K1, R1,Next1, V1〉 and K2 := 〈K2, R2,Next2, V2〉 with a
designated element trm (terminal) in K1 and a designated element ent (entry) from K2 be given. Let the domain
of V1 (notation: Dom(V1)) coincide with the domain of V2 (Dom(V2)). The sequential concatenation of K1 and K2 by
trm, ent is the structure K := 〈K , R,Next, V 〉, where
K := K1 ∪ K2, V (p) := V1(p) ∪ V2(p) for all p ∈ Dom(V1) ;
Next := Next1 ∪ Next2 ∪ {(trm, ent)},
R := R1 ∪ R2 ∪ {(a, b) | a ∈ K1, b ∈ K2}.
We will denote K by K1 ⊕trm,ent K2.
Similarly we define the sequential concatenation of frames. For n,m ∈ N , [n,m] is the Kripke frame based on all
natural numbers situated between n and m with standard≤ and Next. If there is a valuation of a set of letters in [n,m],
we refer to [n,m] as a Kripke structure.
For n,m ∈ N where 1 < n < m, LE (n,m) := [1, n] ⊕n,n+1 C[n + 1,m] is the bi-modal Kripke frame (notation
LE stands to say loop eventually) , with the base set consisting of all numbers from the interval [1,m] where the new
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relations Next and R (we denote them below by NextLE (n,m) and RLE (n,m) to specify the frame in the definition) are
as follows
m NextLE (n,m) n + 1, ∀k, 1 ≤ k < m ⇒ k NextLE (n,m) k + 1;
∀k1, k2 ∈ [1,m], k1 ≤ k2 ⇒ k1RLE (n,m)k2;
∀k1, k2 ∈ [n + 1,m], k1RLE (n,m)k2.
So, LE (n,m) is merely a Kripke linear frame with initial part to be an interval of natural numbers and with the final
part to be a cluster (balloon). We need to extend the notion of truth values of formulas in the language of LTL to
Kripke structures based on these frames LE (n,m). Assume a valuation V of a set of letters Lt in LE (n,m) is given.
The definition of truth values of formulas in the language of LTL constructed out of Lt differs with standard one only
in the step concerning U. We define,
(LE (n,m), a) ϕUψ ⇔[∃b[(a ≤ b ∈ [1,m]) ∧ ((LE (n,m), b) ψ) ∧ ∀c[(a ≤ c < b)
⇒(LE (n,m), c) ϕ]]]
∨
[(a ≥ n + 1) ∧ ∃t[((LE (n,m),NexttLE (n,m)(a)) ψ) ∧ ∀t1[(0 ≤ t1 < t)
⇒(LE (n,m),Nextt1LE (n,m)(a)) ϕ]]].
This definition looks a bit confusing at first glance, because C[n + 1,m] resembles the time cluster, but actually it is
not — to care about U we have to fix the bypass (direction) in this quasi-cluster, so we choose clockwise.
For any consecution cnf in normal reduced form, Pr(cn f ) = {ϕi | i ∈ I } is the set of all disjunctive members of
the premise of cnf. Sub(cn f ) is the set of all subformulas of cnf. For any Kripke frame F and any valuation V of the
set of propositional letters of a formula ϕ, the expression (F Vϕ) is the abbreviation for ∀a ∈ F((F, a) Vϕ).
One more notation we need follows from the evident
Lemma 14. For any Kripke frame F with a valuation V , where F V
∨
Pr(csn f ), and ∀a ∈M, there is a unique
disjunct D from Pr(cn f ) such that (F, a) V D.
In the following we will denote this unique disjunct by D
csn f ,V
F (a). Recall that, for any Kripke structureM with
a valuation V of a set of propositional letters p (Dom(V ) is the set of all such letters), and any world x from M,
ValV (x) := {p | p ∈ Dom(V ), (M, x) V p}.
Lemma 15. If a consecution cnf in the normal reduced form is not admissible in LTL then, there exists a finite
bi-modal linear Kripke structure Kcnf := 〈Fcnf , V1〉 which refutes cnf by V1, where
(i) Fcnf := LE (n,m) for some n > 2 and m > n;
(ii) D
cn f ,V1
Fcnf (n) = D
cn f ,V1
Fcnf (m);
(iii) D
cn f ,V1
Fcnf (1) = D
cn f ,V1
Fcnf (2) = D
cn f ,V1
Fcnf (3);
(iv) n and m are square polynomial in the size of cnf.
Proof. If cnf is not admissible in LTL then, cnf is refuted by some definable valuation in a k-characterizing structure
Chk(LTL) described above (cf. Lemma 9). In particular, cnf is refuted in some disjoint componentN of the structure
Chk(LTL) by a definable inN valuation V1, where V1(xi ) = V (γi ), xi are variables of cnf, γi are formulas in letters
from Dom(V ), and V is the original valuation of Chk(LTL).
Then there is a world a1 ∈ N where (N , a1) V¬x1. Fix some such a1. Firstly we are going to show the part
(iii). Let m be the maximal temporal degree of all formulas γi . Consider the member N1 from the decomposition of
Chk(LTL) in the disjoint union, where (a) the (open up) submodel ofN1 generated by an element b1 is isomorphic to
the (open up) submodel ofN generated by a1, (b) the size of [1, b1] is m + 3, so we may assume b1 = m + 3, and (c)
∀b ∈ [1,m + 3] ValV (x) = ValV (m + 3).
Lemma 16. For arbitrary formula β in letters from Dom(V ) with the temporal degree at most t , where t ≤ m,
∀b ∈ N1, 1 ≤ b ≤ m + 3− t ⇒ [(N1, b) Vβ⇔(N1,m + 3− t) Vβ].
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The proof is a standard verification by induction on the number of occurrences of U and N in β. 
TakeM1 := N1, the valuation V1 evidently refutes cnf inM1, and by Lemma 16, the valuation V1 has the property
(iii): D
cn f ,V1
M1 (1) = D
cn f ,V1
M1 (2) = D
cn f ,V1
M1 (3) in the modelM1. Let, for any a ∈M1,
PD(a) := {Dcn f ,V1M1 (b) | b ∈M1, b ≥ a}.
Choose an amin ∈M1, where amin > 3 and
∀b ∈M1, b ≥ amin ⇒ PD(b) = PD(amin).
Choose the minimal w.r.t. ≤ element cr ∈M1, where cr > amin + 1 and the following holds
{Dcn f ,V1M1 (b) | amin ≤ b ≤ cr } = PD(amin) and (1)
D
cn f ,V1
M1 (amin) = D
cn f ,V1
M1 (cr )
(existence of such cr follows from the choice of amin ∈M1).
Now we modify the Kripke structureM1 by deleting all worlds b > cr and setting new relation R and Next on
[1, cr ] as follows. The relation R is the transitive closure of the relation R∗, where for all a, b ∈ [1, cr ], a ≤ b⇒aR∗b,
cr R∗amin + 1, ∀c, d ∈ [amin + 1, cr ](cR∗d). The relation Next is as the standard one, but with Next(cr ) = amin + 1.
We choose the valuation on [1, cr ] as the restriction of the valuation V1 fromM1. So, the resulting structureM2 is
isomorphic to a structure based on the frame LE (amin, cr ). So, we can consider the truth values of temporal formulas
in the language of LTL at this structure as described earlier.
Lemma 17. For any b ∈ [amin + 1, cr ] ⊂M1, (M2, b) V1Dcn f ,V1M1 (b).
Proof. For any variable xi of the rule cnf,
∀b ∈ [amin + 1, cr ] ⊂M1, (M2, b) V1xi ⇔ (M1, b) V1xi and
(M2, b) V1Nxi ⇔ (M1, b) V1Nxi
follows immediately from the chosen structure ofM2 (Next(cr ) = amin + 1).
If b ∈ [amin + 1, cr ] and (M1, b) V1xiUx j then, for some c ∈ M1, b ≤ c and (M1, c) V1x j and
∀d ∈ [b, c − 1] (M1, d) V1xi . Take the minimal w.r.t ≤ world c with this property. If c ≤ cr then we immediately
get (M2, b) V1xiUx j .
Assume c > cr . Then, in particular, (M1, cr ) V1xiUx j , and, respectively by (1) (M1, amin) V1xiUx j but
(M1, amin)  V1x j . Using (1) again we conclude that for some d, where amin ≤ d ≤ cr , Dcn f ,V1M1 (d) = D
cn f ,V1
M1 (c),
and, in particular, (M1, d) V1x j . And because (M1, amin) V1xiUx j we conclude (M2, amin) V1xiUx j . Still
we have ∀d ∈ [b, c − 1] (M1, d) V1xi , therefore (M1, amin)  V1x j , c > cr and Next(cr ) = amin + 1 imply
(M2, b) V1xiUx j .
For the opposite, assume b ∈ [amin + 1, cr ] and (M2, b) V1xiUx j . Then, for some t ∈ [0, cr − amin + 1],
((M2,NexttM2(b)) x j ) ∧ ∀t1[(0 ≤ t1 < t)⇒(M2,Next
t1
M2(b)) xi ].
Take minimal t satisfying this property. If NexttM2(b) ≥ b, then (M1, b) V1xiUx j evidently holds. Let
NexttM2(b) < b. Then, in particular,
∀x ∈ [b, cr ](M2, x) V1xi (2)
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and (M2, cr ) V1xiUx j , and also (M2, amin + 1) V1xiUx j , but as we know (M2, cr )  V1x j , consequently
(M2, amin)  V1x j . In particular, then we conclude that (M2, cr ) V1xi and by (1) (M1, amin) V1xi , and also
(M1, cr ) V1xi : Else amin < NexttM2(b) < cr and using the facts proved above we conclude
(M1, amin) V1xiUx j
and by (1) (M1, cr ) V1xiUx j . This and (2) imply (M1, b) V1xiUx j . The lemma is proved. 
Lemma 18. For any b ∈ [1, amin] ⊂M1, (M2, b) V1Dcn f ,V1M1 (b).
Proof. Again, for any variable xi ∈ Var(cn f ),
∀b ∈ [1, amin] ⊂M1, (M2, b) V1xi ⇔ (M1, b) V1xi and
(M2, b) V1Nxi ⇔ (M1, b) V1Nxi
follows immediately, and
(M2, b) V1xiUx j ⇒ (M1, b) V1xiUx j
holds by the structure ofM2. If (M1, b) V1xiUx j and there is c ∈M1 where b ≤ c ≤ cr and
(M1, c) V1x j & ∀d[(b ≤ d < c)⇒ (M1, d) V1xi ], (3)
then it is clear that
(M2, b) V1xiUx j .
If (M1, b) V1xiUx j but no c in [b, cr ] satisfies (3) then
∀g ∈ [amin, cr ](M1, g) V1xiUx j , (4)
and by Lemma 17 we conclude
(M2, amin + 1) V1xiUx j .
The truth of xiUx j above and ∀d[(b ≤ d < amin+ 1)⇒ (M1, d) V1xi ] imply that (M2, b) V1xiUx j . Lemma is
proved. 
By this lemma, Lemma 17 and (1) the finite structureM2 has all the required properties from Lemma 15 except
(iv) — effective bound on the size ofM2. This property can be achieved by the following rarefaction technique.
For a couple of worlds a, b ∈M2, b is duplication of a if Nextt (a) = b, for some t , and Dcn f ,V1M2 (a) = D
cn f ,V1
M2 (b).
For any a ∈M2, denote by Prev(a) an element b ∈M2 such that Next(b) = a if such b exists.
For any variable letter x j from cnf, min(x
+
j ) is the minimal i from [amin + 1, cr ] such that (M2, i) V1x j
if such i exists; min(x−j ) is the minimal i from [amin + 1, cr ] such that (M2, i) V1¬x j if such i exists. Let
I nd := {i | i = min(x+j ) or i = min(x−j ), x j ∈ Var(cn f )}. For any pair of worlds a, b ∈M2, where 1 < a < b
and b is duplication of a, if
a, b ∈ (1, amin) or
a, b ∈ (amin+1, cr ) & ∃w, v ∈ I nd [a, b ∈ (w, v) & (w, v) ∩ I nd = ∅],
the structureM2(a, b) obtained fromM2 by deleting all worlds i with i ∈ [a, b) fromM2 and letting Next(Preva) =
b is said to be the rarefaction ofM2 by (a, b).
Lemma 19. IfM2(a, b) is the rarefaction ofM2 by (a, b) then
∀c ∈M2(a, b), (M2(a, b), c) V1Dcn f ,V1M2 (c).
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Proof. This is a standard routine verification. 
Using this lemma we can subsequently rarefyM2 by cutting intervals between duplication pairs from worlds to
their greatest duplications moving from the bottom to the top, and eventually get the Kripke structure with the required
property (iv) from Lemma 15, which concludes its proof. 
The bi-modal frame 1 is the frame whose base set is single element one: |1| = {a1} where Next(a1) = a1 and
a1 ≤ a1. Again we can define truth values of formulas in the language of LTL in 1 in the standard manner.
Lemma 20. If a consecution cnf in the normal reduced form is not admissible in LTL then there exists a valuation
V0 of letters of cnf in the frame 1 where
1 V0
∨
ϕi∈Pr(cn f )
ϕi .
Proof. If cnf is not admissible in LTL then, csnf is refuted by some definable valuation V1 in a k-characterizing
structure Chk(LTL) described above (cf. Lemma 9). Consider this valuation V1(xi ) := V (γi ), where xi are variables
of cnf, γi are formulas in letters from Dom(V ), and V is the original valuation of Chk(LTL). Take the disjoint
component N1 of Chk(LTL), where for all worlds a ∈ N1, ValV (a) = ∅. Then for any formula γi ,
∀a, b ∈ N1 (N1, a) V γi⇔(N1, b) V γi .
Also we have ∀a ∈ N1(N1, a) V1
∨
ϕi∈Pr(cn f ) ϕi . Therefore 1 V0
∨
ϕi∈Pr(cn f ) ϕi , where V0(xi ) = {1} if
V1(xi ) 6= ∅ and V0(xi ) = {} otherwise. Lemma is proved. 
Lemma 21. If a consecution cnf in normal reduced form satisfies the conclusions of Lemmas 15 and 20 then cnf is
not admissible in LTL.
Proof. Let, in accordance with Lemma 15, Kcnf := 〈Fcnf , V1〉 be a finite Kripke structure which refutes cnf by V1,
and
(i) Fcnf := [1, n] ⊕n,n+1 C[n + 1,m],
(ii) D
cn f ,V1
Fcnf (n) = D
cn f ,V1
Fcnf (m),
(iii) D
cn f ,V1
Fcnf (1) = D
cn f ,V1
Fcnf (2) = D
cn f ,V1
Fcnf (3).
The size of 〈Fcnf , V1〉 is now not essential, we will only use here that the structure is finite and that n > 3 and
m > n. Let p1, . . . , pm be propositional letters valuated by the native valuation V of the m-characterizing structure
Chm(LTL). Consider the following formulas associated with worlds of 〈Fcnf , V1〉:
∀k ∈ Fcnf , 1 ≤ k ≤ m;
α(k) := pk ∧
∧
1≤i≤m,i 6=k
¬pi ;
β(k) := α(k) ∧
∧
1<i≤m−k
Niα(k + i) ∧ Nm−k+1α(n + 1);
γ (k, cnf) := β(k) ∧ ¬
(
true U ¬
∨
1≤i≤m
β(i)
)
;
γ (F, cnf) := ¬
[ ∨
1≤i≤m
γ (i, cnf)
]
∧ (true U γ (1, cnf));
γ (¬F, cnf) := ¬
(
true U
∨
1≤i≤m
γ (i, cnf)
)
.
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For k > 1, k ≤ m, 1 ≤ t ≤ k,
γ (F, t, γ (k, cnf)) := ¬
[ ∨
1≤i≤m
γ (i, cnf)
]
∧ ¬
[ ∨
1≤i<t
Ni
∨
1≤ j≤m
(γ ( j, cnf)
]
∧Ntγ (k, cnf).
Consider now a valuation V0 from Lemma 20 which makes the premise of cnf to be valid in the frame 1. Choose the
following definable valuation V2 of all variables xi from cnf in Chm(LTL):
V2(xi ) := V
(∨
{γ (k, cnf) | (Fcnf , k) V1xi } ∨∨
{γ (F, t, γ (k, cnf)) | 1 < k ≤ m, 1 ≤ t ≤ k, (Fcnf , k − t) V1xi }
∨
(
true U
∨
{γ (F, k − 1, γ (k, cnf)) | 1 < k ≤ m, (Fcnf , 1) V1xi }
)
∨Θ(xi ) ∨1(xi )
)
,
where
Θ(xi ) := γ (F, cnf) if (Fcnf , 1) V1xi , otherwise Θ(xi ) := ⊥;
1(xi ) := γ (¬F, cnf) if (1, 1) V0xi , otherwise 1(xi ) := ⊥.
Lemma 22. The following hold:
(1) ∀k ∈ Fcnf ,∀b ∈ V (γ (k, cnf))(Chm(LTL), b) V2Dcn f ,V1Fcnf (k);
(2) ∀k ∈ Fcnf ,∀t, 1 ≤ t < k, ∀b ∈ V (γ (F, t, γ (k, cnf)))
(Chm(LTL), b) V2D
cn f ,V1
Fcnf (k − t);
(3) ∀b ∈ V
(
true U
∨
{γ (F, k − 1, γ (k, cnf)) | 1 < k ≤ m}
)
,
(Chm(LTL), b) V2D
cn f ,V1
Fcnf (1);
(4) ∀b ∈ V (γ (F, cnf)) (Chm(LTL), b) V2Dcn f ,V1Fcnf (1);
(5) ∀b ∈ V (γ (¬F, cnf)) (Chm(LTL), b) V2
∨
ϕi∈Pr(cn f )
ϕi .
Proof. Using the structure of Chm(LTL), definitions of formulas for the choice of the valuation V2 and conditions
(ii) and (iii) specified in the beginning of the proof Lemma 21, (1)–(5) follow by routine computation. 
To continue the proof of Lemma 21, by direct computation, using the structure of Chm(LTL), it is not difficult to
verify that
V (Ω) = Chm(LTL), where
Ω :=
∨
{γ (k, cnf) | 1 ≤ k ≤ m} ∨
∨
{γ (F, t, γ (k, cnf)) | 1 < k ≤ m, 1 ≤ t ≤ k}
∨
(
true U
∨
{γ (F, k − 1, γ (k, cnf)) | 1 < k ≤ m, }
)
∨γ (F, cnf) ∨ γ (¬F, cnf).
Using this observation, Lemma 22 and conclusions of Lemmas 15 and 20 we immediately see that the definable
valuation V2 refutes cnf in Chm(LTL), and hence by Lemma 9, cnf is not admissible in LTL. 
Combining Theorem 12, Lemmas 15, 20 and 21 we derive:
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Theorem 23. There is an algorithm recognizing consecutions admissible in the linear temporal logic LTL.
Regarding the complexity of the deciding algorithm, for any consecution c we first transform c into the reduced
normal form cnf (complexity is single exponential, cf. Theorem 12). Then we verify conditions of Lemmas 15 and
20 in the structures Kcnf := 〈Fcnf , V1〉 whose size is at most square polynomial in the size of cnf. So, we have to
perform the verification of validity for cnf in models of size square polynomial in cnf, so, in sum, of size exponential
in the original consecution. Because the satisfiability in LTL is a subproblem of admissibility, the algorithm is at least
PSPACE-hard.
Recall that we say a consecution c is valid in LTL if c is valid in the frame N .
Theorem 24. There is an algorithm recognizing consecutions valid in LTL.
Proof. This is a much lightened version of the proof of Theorem 23. We give below only a scheme of the proof.
Any consecution cs is valid in LTL if so is csnf. If csnf is invalid in LTL then, as in Lemma 15, there exists a finite
bi-modal linear Kripke structure LE (n,m) with n > 2 and m > n, which refutes csnf and has properties (ii) and
(iv) from Lemma 15. The proof of this fact follows directly to the proof of Lemma 15, we only cannot derive (iii). If
there is a Kripke structure LE (n,m) with n > 2 and m > n, which refutes csnf and has properties (ii) and (iv) from
Lemma 15 then we can show that csnf is refutable in a Kripke structure based on N using the reasoning as in the
proof of Lemma 21, but we do not need to consider the whole model Chm(LTL) and to care about definability of the
refuting valuation. So, csnf is invalid in LTL iff there is a Kripke structure LE (n,m) with n > 2 and m > n, which
refutes csnf and has properties (ii) and (iv) from Lemma 15. 
We know, a formula ϕ is satisfiable in LTL iff the consecution p → p/¬ϕ is not valid (or not admissible) in LTL.
So, we immediately derive the following known fact.
Corollary 25. The logic LTL is decidable, the satisfiability of formulas in LTL is decidable.
Evidently, vice versa, Theorem 24 also follows from Corollary 25 because a consecution ϕ1, . . . ϕk/ψ is valid in
LTL iff∧1≤i≤k Gϕi → Gψ is a theorem ofLTL. The approach in our paper makes the recognition of satisfiability in
LTL very simple from the mathematical (of course, not computational) viewpoint. We need only to consider the linear
Kripke structures of the formLE (n,m). They are finite linear discrete structures with the final balloon possessing fixed
bypass and the unique single state with two distinct entries (altogether of size square polynomial in csnf). And, for
admissibility of inference rules in LTL, the algorithm looks quite similar, only we have to care about property (iii)
from Lemma 15.
Conclusion, future work:We investigated the linear temporal logic LTL from the viewpoint of logical consecutions.
The prime problem we were dealing with was the problem of admissibility for structural inference rules. A reduction
of consecutions and formulas of LTL to uniform inference rules in normal reduced form is proposed. These inference
rules have the premises which are disjunctions of formulas of temporal degree 1 and the conclusion to be a variable.
Starting from this departure point, based on the analysis of Kripke structures and their formula definable subsets, we
find necessary and sufficient conditions for a consecution (rule) to be not admissible in LTL. These conditions lead to
an algorithm which recognizes admissible in LTL rules through the verification of validity for rules in normal reduced
form in Kripke structures of size square polynomial in these rules.
The technique developed in this paper can be applied for other similar linear temporal logics. We studied only one
natural, perhaps most intuitive, linear temporal logic. However there are logics obtained via extensions of the language
of LTL by other logical operations, which do not yield to the technique developed here. We will study these questions
with an attempt to tackle these problems and to find deciding algorithms later.
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